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Abstract
In presidential primaries, proportional campaign resource allocation to states with
respect to their delegate numbers is a desirable concept. To study proportionality,
we introduce a novel model for n-player multi-battle dynamic contests. We show
that when players maximize their expected number of delegates there is a subgame
perfect equilibrium in which players allocate their resources proportionally. However
for at least 4 number of states and at least 2 delegates, when players maximize their
probability of winning, there is always a distribution of delegates over the states such
that population proportionality is not satisfied.
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1 Introduction
Many contests consist of multiple battles, where the final success or failure is determined
by the outcome of these battles. For instance, to win a singles tennis match a player
needs to win two or three sets before the opponent does so.1 Although sports competitions
often constitute the most direct applications of multi-battle contests, such contests have
already received considerable attention in other areas such as R&D races and politics as
well.2 In politics, the presidential elections provide an example of simultaneous but static
(i.e., not dynamic) multi-battle contests, while presidential primaries provide an example
of sequential multiple-battle dynamic contests, as for each of the two major political parties
(Democrats and Republicans) the candidate who wins the majority of the delegates across
all states wins the party’s nomination.
Studying a static model of resource allocation in U.S. presidential campaigns in a promi-
nent paper, in which the goal of the candidates is to maximize their expected electoral vote,
Brams and Davis (1974) highlighted the concepts of ‘population of states’ as well as ‘pop-
ulation proportionality’ in campaign resource allocation.3 Brams and Davis (1974, p. 113)
concluded that “the winner-take-all feature of the Electoral College—i.e., that the popular-
vote winner in each state wins all the electoral votes of that state—induces candidates to
allocate campaign resources roughly in proportion to the 3/2’s power of the electoral votes
of each state.” Moreover, they show that if candidates receive delegates in proportion to
their spendings on each state then population proportionality holds.
Later Lake (1979) argued that one would need to assume that the candidates maximize
only their probability of winning the election, i.e., one would simply try to receive a ma-
jority of electoral votes, instead of complying with Brams and Davis’ (1974) assumption
that they maximize their expected electoral vote. Nevertheless, Lake’s (1979) main result
echoes Brams and Davis’ (1974) impossibility of population proportionality result in that
in Lake’s model too it turns out that presidential candidates find it optimal to spend a
disproportionately large amount of their funds in the larger states. The main difference
between the two models, however, is that Brams and Davis’ (1974) model, which assumes
that the candidates maximize their expected electoral vote, predicts that candidates allo-
cate campaign resources roughly in proportion to the 3/2’s power of the electoral votes of
each state while Lake’s (1979) model, which assumes that the candidates maximize their
probability of winning instead, predicts that candidates allocate campaign resources in
proportion to the Banzhaf power index of each voter in the electorate. Nevertheless, as
1In the PGA Tour, which brings professional male golfers together to play in a number of tournaments
each year (LPGA does so for female golfers), each tournament consists of multiple battles in that golfers
attempt to minimize the total number of shots they take across 72 holes.
2Harris and Vickers (1985), for instance, construed a patent race as a multi-battle contest, in which
two players alternate in expending resources in a sequence of single battles. These battles or sub-contests
serve as the components of the overall R&D contest.
Just like in a singles tennis match, the player who is first to win a given number of battles wins the
contest, by obtaining the patent.
3As noted by Brams and Davis (1973), the population of a state need not exactly reflect the proportion of
the voting-age population who are registered and actually vote in a presidential election. Following Brams
and Davis (1973), we too have taken the simplest course of using population as a first-approximation
estimate of the proportion of voters.
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Win probability maximization Expected delegate maximization
Population proportionality Population proportionality
does not hold (Theorem 1) holds (Theorem 2)
Table 1: A summary of our results
noted by Lake (1979, p. 130), “the Banzhaf and 3/2’s rules give virtually the same results.”
Sela and Erez (2013) study a two player dynamic Tullock contest. Each player maxi-
mizes the sum of the expected payoffs (similar to expected delegate maximization in our
setting) for all districts. They provide a subgame prefect equilibrium such that if the win-
ning value (number of delegates) is equal between the stages and for each resource unit that
a player allocates, he loses 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 units of resource from his budget, then the players’
resource allocations are weakly decreasing over the stages. Duffy and Matros (2015) study
static contests with two players with asymmetric yet similar budgets—generalizing Lake’s
(1979) paper; they provide the Nash equilibrium in contests with up to four states. In a
similar setting, Deck, Sarangi, and Wiser (2017) study symmetric static contests with two
players. Under the assumption that players do not have budget constraints, they find the
Nash equilibrium of the symmetric game (Electoral College).4
While voting occurs simultaneously in U.S. presidential elections, individuals vote se-
quentially in U.S. presidential primaries leading to the presidential elections, which consists
of a series of elections—primaries—held across many states with different population sizes
over several months.
This paper asks the following question: Does one always have the impossibility of
population proportionality in campaign resource allocation in the sequential multi-battle
n-player dynamic-contest environment of presidential primaries? We show that when play-
ers maximize their expected number of delegates (just like Brams and Davis, 1973, have
assumed) there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which players allocate their resources
proportionally. However, when players maximize their probability of winning (just like
Lake, 1979, has assumed), proportionality may not be satisfied.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a novel model for n-
player multi-battle dynamic contests. In Section 3, we analyze the dynamic contests in
which players maximize their probability of winning. We provide two examples with three
and four states. In Section 4, we show that population proportionality satisfies in dynamic
contests whenever players maximize their expected number of delegates.
2 Model
We consider dynamic contests where there are m states (battle fields), indexed by t =
1, 2, ...,m, and n players, indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., n. The battles take place in a predeter-
mined sequential order in states (e.g., New York, California, etc.). Each player i has a fixed
4Additional works on dynamic resource allocation contests include the followings. Dziubinski, Goyal
and Minarsch (2017) study multi-battle dynamic contests on networks in which neighboring ‘kingdoms’
battle in a sequential order. In a two-player and two-stage campaign resource allocation game Kovenock
and Roberson (2009) characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
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budget Wi that he can allocate over the states. In each state t, the number of delegates
that can be won is denoted by xt. Each time period t, the battle at state t takes place
and each player i simultaneously chooses a pure action (allocation) denoted by wti which is
smaller than or equal to the budget, Wi, minus the already spent allocation by player i till
state t. Given the chosen actions in state t, wt := (wt1, . . . , w
t
n), the probability of player i
winning all delegates of state t is defined by a contest success function
pti(w
t) =
{
wti∑
j w
t
j
if
∑
j w
t
j > 0
1
n
if
∑
j w
t
j = 0.
(2.1)
Thus, a dynamic contest is a constant sum game, as what a player wins is a loss for the
other players. To avoid trivial cases, we assume that for any t, xt <
∑
t′ 6=t x
t′ , that is, there
is no “dictatorial state.” Let xti be the number of delegates player i wins at state t, which
is xt with probability pti(w
t) and 0 with probability 1− pti(wt).
The set of histories of length t is denoted by H t. A history of length t ≥ 1 is a sequence
ht := (((w11, x
1
1), . . . , (w
1
n, x
1
n)), . . . , ((w
t
1, x
t
1), . . . , (w
t
n, x
t
n))) (2.2)
satisfying the following conditions
(i) For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n and for each 1 ≤ t′ ≤ t, wt′i ∈ [0,Wi −
∑
j<t′ w
j
i ].
(ii) For each state t′ ≤ t, there exists a unique player i such that xt′i = xt′ and for all
j 6= i, xt′j = 0.
The first property states that each action at any given state t is bounded by the budget set
which diminishes after each action taken in previous battles. The second property states
that the winner of a battle gets all the delegates in that state (winner-takes-all). The
history H0 consists of only the empty sequence ø. Let H = H0∪H1∪ . . .∪Hm. Note that,
the history ht−1 is presented to all players at time t. There is a subset H t ⊂ H consisting
of histories of length t where the game comes to an end at state t. We call H t the set of
terminal histories of length t. If the game has not ended before state m then the game
ends at state m. We will specify terminal histories in detail later on.
The remaining budget of player i after history ht ∈ H is defined as Bi(ht) = Wi −∑
j≤tw
j
i where for every j ≤ t, wji is a realized spending of history ht. The realized
winning schedule of a given history ht ∈ H, denoted by V (ht), is the sequence of play-
ers that won the battles at states 1, . . . , t. Thus V (ht) ∈ {1, . . . , n}t. For example, if
h3 = (((w11, x
1
1), (w
1
2, 0)), ((w
2
1, 0), (w
2
2, x
2
2)), ((w
3
1, 0), (w
3
2, x
3
2))) in a two-player dynamic con-
test with m > 3, then V (h3) = (1, 2, 2).
For player i, a pure strategy σi is a sequence of σ
t
i ’s such that for each t, σ
t
i assigns, to
every ht−1 ∈ H t−1, allocation σti(ht−1) ∈ [0, Bi(ht−1)]. A pure strategy profile is denoted
by σ = (σi)i≤n. The set of pure strategies of player i ≤ n is denoted by Σi and the set
of pure strategy profiles by Σ = i≤nΣi. For any σ ∈ Σ, let (σ|h) = ((σ1|h), . . . , (σn|h))
denote the strategy profile induced by σ in the subgame starting from history h.
Throughout the paper, we will analyze two different dynamic contests in which the
players either (i) maximize the probability of winning the contest, or (ii) maximize the
3
expected number of delegates.
Maximizing probability of winning: A player wins the dynamic contest if he or she
receives the plurality of delegates. In this part, we assume that players maximize the
probability of winning. If at some history a player is guaranteed to lose, then the player’s
remaining budget after that history is 0. Thus players who guaranteed to lose stay in the
game and proportionally spend 0 at the remaining states. Furthermore, if at some history
a player is already guaranteed to win, then the contest ends at this history. Accordingly,
an element h¯t ∈ H is called terminal if the contest ends with battle at state t–if either
t = m or there exists a player i such that∑
j≤t
xji > max{
∑
j≤t
xji′| i′ 6= i}+ xt+1 + . . .+ xm. (2.3)
Let H =
⋃
t≤mH
t be the set of all terminal histories. For any given h¯t ∈ H, let C(h¯t) be
the set of players that have won the highest number of delegates up to and including state
t, which is defined by C(h¯t) = arg maxi≤n
∑
j≤t x
j
i . For h¯
t ∈ H, player i receives a payoff
equal to
ui(h¯
t) =
{
1
|C(h¯t)| if i ∈ C(h¯t)
0 otherwise.
(2.4)
For every t ≤ m, we define ρ : Σ×H t → P(H) where P(H) is the power set of H such that
ρ(σ|ht) denotes the set of terminal histories that are reached with positive probability with
respect to σ conditional on reaching history ht ∈ H t. The probability of a terminal history
h¯ being reached with respect to σ conditional on reaching ht is denoted as q(σ, h¯|ht). The
payoff for player i ≤ n induced by a pure strategy profile σ ∈ Σ at any history ht ∈ H t is
defined as
vi(σ|ht) =
∑
h¯∈ρ(σ|ht)
q(σ, h¯|ht)ui(h¯), (2.5)
We denote vi(σ|ø) by vi(σ). Equation (2.5) and q(σ, h¯|ht) define the payoff of each player
i as follows. For any given terminal history h¯ in ρ(σ|ht), we multiply the probability of
reaching the given history h¯ with the utility player i gets at terminal history h¯ and then
we sum over all terminal histories in ρ(σ|ht).
Maximizing number of delegates: Now suppose that players maximize the number
of delegates they collect, so the terminal histories are exactly the histories with length m.
The set of terminal histories is denoted by Hm, which is equal to Hm. For any h¯m ∈ Hm,
player i receives a payoff equal to
u¯i(h¯
m) =
∑
t≤m
xti, (2.6)
where h¯m := (((w11, x
1
1), . . . , (w
1
n, x
1
n)), . . . , ((w
m
1 , x
m
1 ), . . . , (w
m
n , x
m
n ))).
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Analogous to the maximizing probability of winning case, the set of terminal histories
induced by a strategy profile σ conditional on reaching history h is denoted by ρ(σ|h),
which is a subset of Hm. The payoff for player i ≤ n induced by a pure strategy profile
σ ∈ Σ at any ht ∈ H t is
vi(σ|ht) =
∑
h¯m∈ρ(σ|ht)
q(σ, h¯m|ht)u¯i(h¯m). (2.7)
Subgame perfect equilibrium: A pure strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium if for every state t ≤ m, for every history h ∈ H t, for every player i ≤ n, and
for every strategy σ′i ∈ Σi
vi(σ|h) ≥ vi(σ−i, σ′i|h).
A strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if for every h ∈ H, σ
induces an equilibrium in the subgame starting with history h.
Proportional strategy profile: Here we define a very specific pure strategy profile
σ. For any t, for any nonterminal history ht−1 ∈ H −H, and for any player i, let
σti(h
t−1) = Bi(ht−1)
xt
xt + . . .+ xm
. (2.8)
We call σ the proportional pure strategy profile. Note that under σ, no matter what
the other players do, every player proportionally allocates his available budget over the
remaining states.
A dynamic contest is called population proportional if the proportional strategy profile
is a subgame perfect equilibrium. The focus of the paper is the class of dynamic contests
which are population proportional.
3 Maximizing the probability of winning
In this section, the players maximize their probability of winning the primary elections—
just like Lake (1979) has assumed. Here we analyze three examples of dynamic contests: i)
3-identical-state dynamic contest. ii) 4-state dynamic contest where the first state is larger
(higher delegate number) than the 3 other identical states. iii) 4-state dynamic contest
where the last state is larger (higher delegate number) than the first 3 identical states.
We show that 3-identical-state dynamic contest satisfies population proportionality. Fur-
thermore, we provide nontrivial examples of 4-state battles that do not admit population
proportionality. The 3-state example consists of 1-delegate states while the 4-state exam-
ples involve three 1-delegate states and one 2-delegate state with two different possible
spots in the sequence of battles.
Finally, we show that for any n-player dynamic contest with at least four states and
at least two delegates, there is always a distribution of delegates over the states such
that population proportionality does not satisfy. This result too echoes Brams and Davis’
(1974) and Lake’s (1979) result on impossibility of population proportionality. We prove
an extension of this result to dynamic contests.
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3.1 Example I: The dynamic contest with 3 identical states
Suppose that there are two players A and B with equal budget W = 100 and three identical
states. We use backward induction. If for given h2, V (h2) is equal to (A,A) or (B,B),
which means player A has already won or lost the first two battles, then the contest comes
to an end and player A wins or loses, respectively. If for given h2, V (h2) is equal to (A,B)
or (B,A) then the dynamic contest continues to the last battle and in the subgame after
h2, the unique best response is to allocate all of the remaining budget to the last battle.
Therefore, in any subgame after any nonterminal history h2 the strategy profile (σ3A, σ
3
B),
which is to spend the remaining budget to the last state, is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Now, suppose that for h1, V (h1) = (A). Then, player A’s best response to B is to
maximize his payoff
vA(σ|h1) = vA(((σ1A, σ1B), (σ2A, σ2B), (σ3A, σ3B))|h1) (3.1)
with respect to σ2A. Given a fixed σ
2
B, player A solves the following maximization problem
max
σ2A
vA(σ|h1) = max
σ2A(h
1)
(p2A(σ
2
A(h
1), σ2B(h
1))
+ (1− p2A(σ2A(h1), σ2B(h1)))
× p3A(BA(h1)− σ2A(h1), BB(h1)− σ2B(h1))) (3.2)
= max
σ2A(h
1)
(
σ2A(h
1)
σ2A(h
1) + σ2B(h
1)
+
σ2B(h
1)
σ2A(h
1) + σ2A(h
1)
× 100− w
1
A − σ2A(h1)
200− w1A − σ2A(h1)− w1B − σ2B(h1)
) (3.3)
= max
w2A
(
w2A
w2B + w
2
B
+
w2B
w2A + w
2
B
× 100− w
1
A − w2A
200− w1A − w2A − w1B − w2B
). (3.4)
Equality (3.2) holds, since player A already won the first state, in order to win the contest
player A either needs to win the second battle—given h¯2 with V (h¯2) = (A,A)—, or if he
loses the second then to win the third battle—given h2 with V (h2) = (A,B). Moreover, if
the game continues to the last state, then spending the remaining budget is the unique best
reponse in the subgame after given history. Equality (3.3) follows from the contest success
function. Equality (3.4) follows from the definition of a strategy which maps histories to
actions in the following battle.
As player A wants to maximize vA(σ|h1), player B wants to minimize it. We derive
best response functions from the first-order condition of vA(σ|h1) with respect to σ2A(h1)
and σ2B(h
1), respectively. The intersection of best responses provides us the following two
conditions5
w2A =
1
2
(100− w1A), (3.5)
w2B =
1
2
(100− w1B). (3.6)
5Detailed calculations are available in the Appendix.
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So far, we have showed that the pair (σ3A, σ
3
B)—in which players each allocate the remaining
budget to the last state—, and the pair ((σ2A, σ
2
B),(σ
3
A, σ
3
B))—in which strategies satisfy
(3.5) and (3.6)—are Nash equilibria in their respective subgames. Now, we suppose that
h = ø. Then, player A best responds to B by maximizing his payoff vA(σ|ø) = vA(σ) with
respect to σ1A(ø)
max
σ1A(ø)
vA(σ) = max
σ1A(ø)
(p1A(w
1)(p2A(w
2) + (1− p2A(w2))p3A(w3))
+ (1− p1A(w1))p2A(w2)p3A(w3)). (3.7)
where w1 = (σA(ø), σB(ø)), and w
2, w3 are elements of [0, 100 − w1A] × [0, 100 − w1B] and
[0, 100−w1A−w2A]×[0, 100−w1B−w2B], respectively. But since we have already concluded that
whoever wins the first battle, both players should invest equally all their remaining budget
to the last two states by equations (3.5) and (3.6), we can write w2A = w
3
A = (1/2)(100−w1A)
and w2B = w
3
B = (1/2)(100− w1B). Thus, we can rewrite equation (3.7) as
max
σA(ø)=w
1
A
(w1A − 100) ((w1A)2 + 3(w1A)(w1B − 100)− 100w1B)
(w1A + w
1
B − 200)2(w1A + w1B)
. (3.8)
Equations (3.7) and (3.8) follows from the analogous reasoning for equations (3.2),(3.3) and
(3.4). By the same method as for vA(σ|h1), the first order condition of vA(σ) with respect
to σA(ø) and σB(ø) yields the best response functions of players A and B. The intersection
of the best responses leads to the condition w1A = w
1
B = 100/3. From equations (3.5), (3.6)
and w1A = w
1
B=100/3, we deduce that w
1
A = w
2
A = w
3
A = w
1
B = w
2
B = w
3
B = 100/3, which
concludes that every subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile of Example I satisfies
proportionality.6
3.2 Example II: Dynamic contests with 4 states
To illustrate our model with a nontrivial example, suppose that there are two players A
and B with equal budget W = 100 and 4 states, one of which is a 2-delegate state and the
other states each has 1 delegate. Thus, if a player wins the 2-delegate state and one other
state, or wins all the 1-delegate states, then he ends up winning the dynamic contest. We
next provide two examples for 4-state case in which the 2-delegate state is the first and last
battle, respectively. We show that neither contest admits a proportional subgame perfect
equilibrium strategy profile.7
Case I8: Let the 2-delegate state be the first battle. If for given h2, V (h2) is equal to
(A,A) or (B,B), which means player A has already won or lost the first two battles, then
the contest comes to an end and player A wins or loses, respectively. If for given h3, V (h3)
is equal to (A,B,B) or (B,A,A), then the dynamic contest continues to the last battle.
And, for the subgame after the given history the unique best response for each player (σ4A
and σ4B) is to allocate all the remaining budget to the last battle.
6This example is similar to the benchmark example of Fu, Lu, and Pan (2015, p. 9); though, our
settings differ when the states are not identical.
7Calculations are available upon request.
8From this point on, we take pti as p
t
i(w
t).
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For given h2, V (h2) = (A,B), player A best responds to B by maximizing his payoff
vA(σ|h2) with respect to σ3A
max
σ3A
vA(σ|h2) = max
σ3A(h
2)
vA(σ|h2) = max
w3A
(p3A + (1− p3A)p4A),
which is analogous to the dynamic contest with 3 identical states. Hence, each player
allocating equally his remaining budget to states 3 and 4 is the unique best response,
(σ3A, σ
4
A) and (σ
3
B, σ
4
B), for subgames starting with history h
2. Now suppose that for given
h1, if V (h1) = (A), then player A best responds to B by maximizing his payoff
max
σ2A(h
1)
vA(σ|h1) = max
w2A
(p2A + (1− p2A)p3A + (1− p2A)(1− p3A)p4A). (3.9)
We derive Equation (3.9) by an analogous method from Example I. To obtain the best
response functions, we take the first order conditions of the payoff functions with respect to
σ2A(h
1) and σ2B(h
1), respectively. The intersection of the best responses yields the following
two conditions
w2A =
1
3
(100− w1A), (3.10)
w2B =
1
3
(100− w1B). (3.11)
Given that each player wins one battle from the first two battles, we already concluded that
players allocate their remaining budget to states 3 and 4 equally. Thus, by equations (3.10)
and (3.11), we conclude that whoever is the winner of the first battle, players allocating
equally their remaining budget to three identical states is the best response for any subgame
after the first battle.
Now, we suppose that h1 = ø. Then, player A best responds to B by maximizing his
payoff vA(σ|ø) = vA(σ) with respect to σ1A(ø) which is maxσ1A(ø) vA(σ), i.e.,
max
σ1A(ø)
vA(σ) = max
w1A
(p1A(p
2
A + (1− p2A)p3A
+ (1− p2A)(1− p3A)p4A) + (1− p1A)p2Ap3Ap4A)
=
(w1A − 100) (4(w1A)2 (w1B − 125) + (w1A)3 + 10000w1B)
(w1A + w
1
B − 200) 3 (w1A + w1B)
+
(w1A − 100)(w1A (3(w1B)2 − 1100w1B + 70000))
(w1A + w
1
B − 200) 3 (w1A + w1B)
(3.12)
Equation (3.12) is derived from a similar method applied to equation (3.9). First order
condition of equation (3.12) with respect to w1A and w
1
B yields the best response functions of
players A and B. We deduce that w1A = w
1
B = 50 is at the intersection of the best responses.
Hence, equations (3.10) and (3.11) imply that w2A = w
3
A = w
4
A = w
2
B = w
3
B = w
4
B = 50/3.
In conclusion, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile σ such that on
an equilibrium path of σ, players spend half of their budget to the 2-delegate state and
then equally split the remaining budget among 1-delegate states. Thus, case I does not
admit proportionality.
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Case II: Let the 2-delegate state be the last battle. If for given h2, V (h2) is equal to
(A,B) or (B,A), then players allocating all their remaining budget to the 2-delegate state
is the unique best response for the subgame starting from history h2. If for given h2, V (h2)
is equal to (A,A), then in the following subgame of the related history, player A needs
only one of the remaining states and player B needs both states to win the contest which
is the same case as in Example I after the first battle. Thus, the unique best responses are
players distributing equally their remaining budget on the last two states. Therefore, in
any subgame after any history h2 ∈ H, there is no equilibrium that is proportional. Hence,
case II does not admit proportionality.
The following theorem provides a class of dynamic contests that does not admit popu-
lation proportionality whenever players maximize probability of winning.
Theorem 1 For any m ≥ 4 number of states and any n ≥ 2 candidates, there exists a
dynamic contest, where players maximize their probability of winning, for which population
proportionality fails.
Proof: Consider a dynamic contest such that x1 = . . . = xm−1 = 1 and xm = 3. Consider
the history hm−2 where candidate 1 wins state 1, candidate 2 wins state 2, candidate 1 wins
state 3 and so on up to and including state m− 2. Thus, for history hm−2, the maximum
amount of delegate difference between candidate 1 and candidate 2 is 1. In the subgame
after history hm−2, candidate 1 and candidate 2 spending all their budget to the last state
is the unique Nash equilibrium. Since we reach history hm−2 with positive probability
under the proportional strategy profile, the dynamic contest does not admit population
proportionality. 
4 Maximizing the expected number of delegates
In this section, we assume that players maximize the expected number of delegates—just
like Brams and Davis (1973) have assumed. They showed that proportionality is satisfied
in two-player static games. The following theorem illustrates a different and intuitive proof
for n-player dynamic contests.
Theorem 2 For any dynamic contest where players maximize their expected number of
delegates, population proportionality is satisfied.
Proof: We show that the proportional strategy profile σ = (σi)i≤n is robust to one-
shot deviations. That is, any player i at any nonterminal history ht can not improve
his payoff by changing σti , given that all other players, j 6= i, follow the proportional
strategy. If player i switches to a strategy σ¯i = (σ¯
t+1
i , σ
t+2
i , . . . , σ
m
i ) after history h
t such
that σ¯t+1i (h
t) 6= σt+1i (ht), then the expected number of delegates player i wins after state t
given the history ht is denoted as vi,t+1(σ¯i, σ−i|ht), which satisfies
vi,t+1(σ¯i, σ−i|ht) = x
t+1σ¯t+1i (h
t)
σ¯t+1i (h
t) +
∑
j 6=i σ
t+1
j (h
t)
+ vi,t+2(σ|ht+1dev ), (4.1)
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where ht+1dev is a successor of h
t with the property that at state t+ 1 player i spent σ¯t+1i (h
t),
and each player j 6= i spent proportionally. And the expected number of delegates of player
i after history ht if she follows σ,
vi,t+1(σ|ht) = x
t+1σt+1i (h
t)∑
1≤j≤n σ
t+1
j (h
t)
+ vi,t+2(σ|ht+1), (4.2)
where ht+1 is a successor of ht with the property that at state t + 1, each player spent
proportionally. For simplicity we take
xt+1 + . . .+ xm
xt+1
= k,
Bi(h
t) = a,∑
j 6=i
Bj(h
t) = b,
σ¯t+1i (h
t) = σt+1i (h
t) + ∆ =
a
k
+ ∆.
where ∆ is a real number. We can rewrite player i’s probability of winning state t + 1 if
he plays σ¯t+1i (h
t) as
σ¯t+1i (h
t)
σ¯t+1i (h
t) +
∑
j 6=i σ
t+1
j (h
t)
=
a
k
+ ∆
a
k
+ ∆ + b
k
=
a+ ∆k
a+ ∆k + b
,
and player i’s probability of winning state t+ 1 if he plays σt+1i (h
t) as
σt+1i (h
t)∑
1≤j≤n σ
t+1
j (h
t)
=
a
k
a
k
+ b
k
=
a
a+ b
.
Since σ is a proportional strategy profile, for any t, for any ht, and for successor of histories
where ht+1 is a successor of ht, ht+2 is a successor of ht+1, and so on up to and including
hm is a successor of hm−1, given that players follow proportional strategy profile, we have
σt+1i (h
t)∑
1≤j≤n σ
t+1
j (h
t)
=
σt+2i (h
t+1)∑
1≤j≤n σ
t+2
j (h
t+1)
= . . . =
σmi (h
m−1)∑
1≤j≤n σ
m
j (h
m−1)
=
a
a+ b
,
which means that player i wins each state after ht with equal probability if he/she follows
σi. That is, if players follow the proportional strategy profile, the proportions of the
remaining budgets stay constant throughout the battles. The same property satisfies for
the strategy profile (σ¯i, σ−i) after history ht+1dev . Hence for successor of histories where h
t+2
dev
is a successor of ht+1dev , h
t+3
dev is a successor of h
t+2
dev , and so on up to and including h
m
dev is a
successor of hm−1dev , given that players follow proportional strategy profile after history h
t+1
dev ,
we have
σt+2i (h
t+1
dev )∑
1≤j≤n σ
t+2
j (h
t+1
dev )
=
σt+3i (h
t+2
dev )∑
1≤j≤n σ
t+3
j (h
t+2
dev )
= . . . =
σmi (h
m−1
dev )∑
1≤j≤n σ
m
j (h
m−1
dev )
.
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Now we can simply calculate player i’s probability of winning any state after history ht+1dev ,
if player i follows the strategy σ¯i
σt+2i (h
t+1
dev )∑
1≤j≤n σ
t+2
j (h
t+1
dev )
=
a− a
k
−∆
a− a
k
−∆ + b− b
k
.
Therefore we can rewrite equation (4.1) as
vi,t+1(σ¯i, σ−i|ht) = xt+1 a+ ∆k
a+ ∆k + b
+
a− a
k
−∆
a− a
k
−∆ + b− b
k
(xt+2 + . . .+ xm),
And we can rewrite equation (4.2) as
vi,t+1(σ|ht) = a
a+ b
(xt+1 + . . .+ xm).
We show that vi(σ|ht)− vi(σ¯i, σ−i|ht) ≥ 0, in other words show that
xt+1(
a
a+ b
− a+ ∆k
a+ ∆k + b
) + (xt+2 + . . .+ xm)(
a
a+ b
− a−
a
k
−∆
a− a
k
−∆ + b− b
k
) ≥ 0. (4.3)
Since k − 1 = (xt+2 + . . .+ xm)/(xt+1), we can rewrite inequality (4.3) as
(
a
a+ b
− a+ ∆k
a+ ∆k + b
) + (k − 1)( a
a+ b
− a−
a
k
−∆
a− a
k
−∆ + b− b
k
) ≥ 0. (4.4)
We can simplify inequality (4.4) as
b∆2k3
(a+ b)(a(k − 1) + b(k − 1)−∆k)(a+ b+ ∆k) ≥ 0. (4.5)
Inequality (4.5) satisfies because we have the following conditions
a ≥ a
k
+ ∆,
b(k − 1) ≥ 0,
a
k
+ ∆ ≥ 0.
Thus, for any ∆ we have vi(σ|ht)− vi(σ¯i, σ−i|ht) ≥ 0. 
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Appendix
4.1 Example I
The first order conditions of vA(σ|h1) with respect to σ2A(h1) and σ2A(h1) are
∂vA(σ|h1)
∂σ2A(h
1)
=
∂vA(σ|h1)
∂w2A
=
w2B (w
1
B + w
2
B − 100) (w1A + 2w2A + w1B + 2w2B − 200)
(w2A + w
2
B)
2 (w1A + w
2
A + w
1
B + w
2
B − 200) 2
= 0. (4.6)
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∂vA(σ|h1)
∂σ2B(h
1)
=
∂vA(σ|h1)
∂w2B
= − (w
2
A)
2 (w1B + 2 (w
2
B − 50))
(w2A + w
2
B)
2(w1A + w
2
A + w
1
B + w
2
B − 200)2
− w
2
A (w
1
A (w
1
B + 2 (w
2
B − 50)) + (w1B)2)
(w2A + w
2
B)
2(w1A + w
2
A + w
1
B + w
2
B − 200)2
− w
2
A (2 (w
2
B − 150)w1B + 2 (w2B − 100) 2)
(w2A + w
2
B)
2(w1A + w
2
A + w
1
B + w
2
B − 200)2
− (w
1
A − 100) (w2B)2
(w2A + w
2
B)
2(w1A + w
2
A + w
1
B + w
2
B − 200)2
= 0. (4.7)
From equations (4.6) and (4.7) we conclude best response functions BRA and BRB such
that
BRA(σ
2
B(h
1)) =
1
2
(−w1A − w1B − 2w2B + 200) ,
BRB(σ
2
A(h
1)) =
−w2A (w1A + w2A + w1B − 200)
w1A + 2 (w
2
A − 50)
+
√
w2A (w
1
A + w
2
A − 100)
w1A + 2 (w
2
A − 50)
×
√
(w2A − w1B + 100) (w1A + w2A + w1B − 200)
w1A + 2 (w
2
A − 50)
.
The intersection of best responses provides us the following two conditions
w2A =
1
2
(100− w1A),
w2B =
1
2
(100− w1B).
The first order conditions of vA(σ) with respect to σ
1
A(ø) and σ
1
A(ø) are
∂vA(σ)
∂w1A
=
2(w1B − 100)(w1A)2(3w1B − 100)
(w1A + w
1
B − 200)3(w1A + w1B)2
+
2(w1B − 100) (w1Aw1B(3w1B − 500)− 200(w1B − 100)w1B)
(w1A + w
1
B − 200)3(w1A + w1B)2
= 0,
∂vA(σ)
∂w1B
= −2(w
1
A − 100) ((w1A)2(3w1B − 200))
(w1A + w
1
B − 200)3(w1A + w1B)2
− 2(w
1
A − 100)w1A (3(w1B)2 − 500w1B + 20000)
(w1A + w
1
B − 200)3(w1A + w1B)2
+
2(w1A − 100) (100(w1B)2)
(w1A + w
1
B − 200)3(w1A + w1B)2
= 0.
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From the above equations ∂vA(σ)/∂w
1
A = 0 and ∂vA(σ)/∂w
1
B = 0, we find the best response
functions of player A and B.
BRA(σ
1
B(ø)) =
−3(w1B)2 + 500w1B
6w1B − 200
−
√
9(w1B)
3 − 600(w1B)2 − 70000w1B + 8000000
√
w1B
6w1B − 200
.
BRB(σ
1
A(ø)) =
−3(w1A)2 + 500w1A
6w1A − 200
.
−
√
9(w1A)
3 − 600(w1A)2 − 70000w1A + 8000000
√
w1A
6w1A − 200
.
The intersection of the best responses leads to the condition w1A = w
1
B = 100/3.
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